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Abstract 
In the literature, most of the authors conclude that public spending and direct taxes 
reduce income inequality while indirect taxes increase inequality.  However, fiscal policies 
have a different impact in different countries. This work intends to provide an analysis of 
how different fiscal policy instruments affect the income distribution. In this sense, the main 
objective of this work is to theoretically inspect and also to empirically assess how the tax 
structure (e.g., direct and indirect taxation) and the public spending structure (e.g., 
expenditures on education, health, social protection) affects income inequality, based on the 
set of countries usually designated in literature by PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and 
Spain) and comparing these countries with the EMU core (Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands), for a time period of 20 years (1996-2015). For doing so, we 
will follow the methodology used by Ramos and Roca-Sagales (2008), based on a vector 
autoregression model (VAR). The main results obtained through the VAR estimation is that: 
i) in PIIGS, the health expenditures, indirect taxes and social security contributions have a 
positive effect on output; ii) in core countries, the spending on social protection has a 
negative effect on output, although the education spending and indirect taxes have a positive 
effect on output; iii) in PIIGS, social security contributions have a positive effect on income 
inequality while spending on education and health has a negative effect, reducing income 
inequality; iv) in central European countries, spending on social protection has a negative 
effect on inequality while spending on “others” has a positive effect, increasing inequality; v) 
the link of GDP to Gini is more significant and negative in the PIIGS and, on the reverse 
causality, the Gini has a positive impact on the GDP growth in PIIGS, but a negative impact 
on the growth rate of the core countries. 
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Resumo 
Na literatura existente, a maioria dos autores concluem que os gastos públicos e os 
impostos diretos reduzem a desigualdade de rendimentos,  enquanto que os impostos 
indiretos aumentam a desigualdade. No entanto, as políticas orçamentais têm um impacto 
diferente em diferentes países. Este trabalho pretende fornecer uma análise de como 
diferentes instrumentos de política orçamental afetam a distribuição de rendimentos. Nesse 
sentido, o objetivo principal deste trabalho é analisar teoricamente, e também avaliar 
empiricamente como a estrutura dos impostos (por exemplo, impostos diretos e indiretos) e 
a estrutura dos gastos públicos (por exemplo, gastos com educação, saúde, proteção social) 
afetam a desigualdade na distribuição de rendimentos, tendo por base o conjunto de países 
usualmente designado na literatura por PIIGS (Portugal, Itália, Irlanda, Grécia e Espanha) e 
comparando estes países com os países do centro da Europa (Áustria, Finlândia, França, 
Alemanha e Holanda) durante um período de 20 anos (1996-2015). Para tal, segue-se a 
metodologia utilizada por Ramos e Roca-Sagales (2008), baseada num modelo de Vetores 
Autorregressivos (VAR). Os principais resultados da nossa análise são: i) nos PIIGS, os 
gastos em saúde, os impostos indiretos e as contribuições para a segurança social têm um 
efeito positivo no produto; ii) nos países do centro da Europa, os gastos em proteção social 
têm efeitos negativos no produto, enquanto que os gastos em educação e os impostos 
indiretos têm um efeito positivo no produto; iii) nos PIIGS, as contribuições para a segurança 
têm um efeito positivo na desigualdade de rendimentos enquanto que os gastos em educação 
e saúde têm um efeito negativo, diminuindo a desigualdade de rendimentos; iv) nos países 
do centro da Europa, os gastos em proteção social têm um efeito negativo na desigualdade 
enquanto que os “outros” gastos têm um efeito positivo, aumentando a desigualdade;  v) a 
ligação do PIB para o coeficiente de Gini é mais significativa e negativa nos PIIGS, e, na 
relação inversa, o coeficiente de Gini tende a apresentar uma relação positiva no o 
crescimento do PIB nos PIIGS, mas uma relação negativa no crescimento do PIB nos países 
do centro da Europa. 
 
Palavras-chave: desigualdade de rendimentos, política orçamental, gastos públicos, 
estrutura de impostos 
Códigos JEL: D30, D63, H20, H50 
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1. Introduction 
Income distribution is unequal, both in developed and developing countries. 
According to Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012), based on data from the World Income 
Inequality Database, from 1970 until the mid-1980s, income inequality of a set of developing 
and developed countries decreased at an accelerated rate. After having stabilized in the mid-
1980s, inequality has increased dramatically, especially in the beginning of the 1990s. 
Unweighted and weighted by the GDP, Gini coefficients showed decreases in the early 
2000s, although the population weighted Gini continued to increase. Still without available 
data for many countries, Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012) argue that inequality is expected to 
increase after the financial crisis of 2008. 
While income inequality has been increasing in many advanced economies, fiscal 
policies have played a key role in trying to reduce income inequality over recent decades 
through instruments such as transfers, taxes and government expenditures. These 
instruments are needed to reduce inequality, making sure that no group is left behind 
regarding development. However, according to, for example, Bastagli et al. (2012), their 
redistributive impact has diminished since the mid-1990s. 
In this context, the research question of this dissertation is to analyze the impact that 
government revenue and government spending have on income distribution, namely: i) 
which mechanisms operate from (different) government expenditures and revenues to 
income inequality? ii) are these mechanisms different, meaningfully affecting fiscal policy  
impact on inequality? This dissertation will provide a joint analysis of the output of fiscal 
policy and looks at the different incidence of policies from both the expenditure and the 
revenue side. Thus, the main objective of this work is to theoretically inspect and also to 
empirically assess how different fiscal policy instruments affect income distribution.  
This dissertation intends to contribute to the literature on the relation between fiscal 
policy and income distribution inequality. First, there is still no systematic review for recent 
years; due to the financial crisis and the great recession since 2008 until 2012 there have been 
many changes in the economies and it is important to analyze how these changes affected 
the effectiveness of different fiscal instruments on income inequality. We propose to study 
such relation using more recent data. Second, as far as we know, there is no comprehensive 
review on compared mechanisms of different fiscal policy instruments on income inequality 
as we intend to do. Third, most of the literature computes fiscal policy income multipliers 
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while we propose to disentangle income and inequality multipliers of fiscal policy . An 
inequality multiplier measure the impact on income distribution inequality (measured by Gini 
coefficient, in our case), of a variation on revenue and expenditures of Government.  
One of the main conclusions in the literature is that the impacts of taxation and public 
spending in income distribution differ across the countries. For example, comparing Europe 
with Latin America, “the redistributive impact of the fiscal system is very large in Europe and very small 
in Latin America and where fiscal redistribution is significant, it is achieved mostly through transfers rather 
than taxes” (Goñi et al., 2011, p. 1). Given that, and since most of the empirical work assessing 
this relation is based on data for a single country, we propose to rely on a panel data for the 
so-called PIIGS countries. The PIIGS countries is a set of the five most vulnerable Eurozone 
economies during the crisis that started in 2008-2009. This group includes Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland, Greece and Spain. In 2014, according to data from OECD database,1 PIIGS 
countries are those with the highest level of inequality. Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and 
Italy are at the top of this negative ranking. In this work, we will also do a benchmark of 
these countries with the core countries: Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria and Finland. 
Summing-up, this work aims at analyzing the mechanisms through which the tax 
structure (e.g., direct, indirect taxation) and the spending structure (e.g., expenditures on 
education, health, social protection) affects income inequality and quantitatively assess their 
effect on income inequality in PIIGS countries, comparing with the core countries. 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. After introduction, section 2 presents a 
review of the literature on the relation between public spending, tax structure and income 
inequality. In section 3, we describe the empirical methodology adopted in this study, as well 
as the detail of the variables and the data sources used in the construction of the database.  
In section 4, will be presented and discussed the results obtained, that includes the analyzes 
of the impulse response functions and the fiscal multipliers. Finally, section 5 presents the 
main conclusions of this study. 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm   
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Inequality and Fiscal Policy 
There are several types of inequalities: political inequality (e.g., civic inequality and 
inequality before the law), economic inequality (e.g., inequality of income and wealth), 
inequality of opportunity (e.g., inequality of access to education, health services), inequality 
of treatment (e.g., inequality of agency and responsibility) and inequality of membership in 
society (Mount, 2008). 
In this dissertation, we will focus on the definition of economic inequality, and 
particularly in income inequality. Income inequality corresponds to the unequal distribution 
of household or individual income across the participants in an economy. It’s the existence 
of disparities in income distribution, that is, the existing gap between incomes of the ri chest 
and those of the poorest. 
Now, it’s important to distinguish different concepts about the income. Disposable 
income corresponds to the amount of money that households have available for invest, 
consume and save after income taxes have been accounted for. On the other hand, market 
income corresponds to the amount of money that households have available before income 
taxes have been accounted for. So, market income inequality corresponds to income 
inequality before transfers and taxes and disposable income inequality corresponds to 
income inequality after transfers and taxes. Thus, it is expected that the inequality of 
disposable incomes varies more across countries than market income inequality.  
There are various ways of measuring the income inequality. The choice of a  measure 
does not change significantly how inequality looks like. However, changes in inequality over 
time within individual countries can look different if different measures are used. We can 
measure the income inequality through the ratio measures, that compares how much income 
people at one level of income distribution have compared to people at another level. S80/S20 
is the ratio of the average income of the 20% richest to the 20% poorest; P90/P10 is the 
ratio of the upper bound value of the ninth decile (i.e. the 10% of people with highest 
income) to that of the first decile; P90/P50 is the ratio of the upper bound value of the ninth 
decile to the median income; and P50/P10 is the ration of median income to the upper 
bound value of the first decile. Another way to measure the income inequality is through the 
Palma ratio, that corresponds to the share of all income received by the 10% people with 
highest disposable income divided by the share of all income received by the 40% people 
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with the lowest disposable income OECD (2018). 
Among other several measures of income inequality, the Gini coefficient is of most 
widespread use. For instance, Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012) use this indicator to analyze the 
impact of government taxes and expenditures on income distribution. The Gini coefficient 
compares the cumulative proportions of the population against the cumulative proportions 
of income they receive, and takes values between 0 and 1: if the Gini coefficient is equal to 
1, it means that all the income is held by a single person; if Gini coefficient equals 0, it means 
that income is equally shared among population (perfect equality) . Thus, the lower is the Gini 
value, the more equal a society is. The Gini coefficient can be computed relying on gross 
income or market income (before taxes and transfers) or disposable income (after taxes and 
transfers). The Gini will change depending on what is measured. Most of authors measure 
the impact of the government spending and the government revenue on income inequality 
as the difference between the gross income Gini and the disposable income Gini: when 
countries face a faster rate of increase in net Gini coefficient than in gross Gini coefficient, 
it indicates a decrease in the distributional impact of fiscal policy (Odusola, 2017).  
Now, regarding to fiscal policy, this is the primary tool through which Governments 
can affect the income distribution. Both revenue and Government expenditure may change 
the distribution of income, both in the short and medium term (Kyriacou et al., 2016). The 
redistributive potential of fiscal policy plays an important role in reducing inequalities and 
increasing long-term growth. This efficiency eases budgetary constraints by facilitating higher 
levels of redistribution at certain levels of expenditure and taxation. That is, countries with 
strict fiscal rules have a better redistribution because of the stabilizing effect of these rules 
on fiscal policy (Kyriacou et al., 2016). According to Cevik and Correa-Caro (2015), fiscal 
policy requires a series of structural reforms that aim to sustain economic growth as well as 
a greater access to all segments of society. 
Fiscal policy has contributed to changes in income inequality in most countries (Cevik 
and Correa-Caro, 2015). However, their impact is different across the countries. Some 
countries use their tax and transfer systems to redistribute market incomes much more 
significantly than other countries (Michal, 2018). For example, in European Union, the tax 
and benefit systems vary significantly in size and structure (Paulus et al., 2009).  
Since mid-1990s, tax and benefit systems have become less redistributive in many 
countries. Cash transfers and income taxes reduce income inequality for a quarter of the 
working-age population. The main reasons for the decreased of the capacity of redistribution 
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are on the side of the benefits due to cuts in expenditure of social protection and the 
breakdown of transfers to lower income groups (OECD, 2012). Immervoll and Richardson 
(2011), also find that tax-benefit policies had become less effective in redistribution. In 
contrast, Wang and Caminada (2014), did not find that tax-benefit policies had become less 
effective in redistribution since the mid-1990s. They found that among the total population, 
both primary income inequality and redistribution continued to rise after the mid-1990s. 
Thus, the tax-benefit systems in the mid-2000s were even more effective at reducing 
inequality compared with the mid-1990s (Wang and Caminada, 2014). According to these 
authors, between the mid-1980 and mid-2000, the redistribution system (cash transfers and 
direct taxes) offset two-thirds of the increase in income inequality. The total redistribution 
increased, driven by the stronger redistributive effect of transfers. Regarding to direct taxes, 
in some countries the capacity of these taxes have declined. So, the trend of overall 
redistribution was caused mainly by transfers (Wang and Caminada, 2014). 
Before presenting some findings, it is important to define the concept of progressivity 
and regressivity. Following Chu et al. (2000), the government spending is progressive 
(regressive) if the benefits to the bottom quintile are larger (smaller) than the benefits to the 
top quintile, relative to their income or expenditure. So, with progressive spending, benefits 
represent a smaller fraction of income or expenditure at a higher income or expenditure 
quintiles (Chu et al., 2000). Regarding to taxes, a progressive tax is defined as a tax whose rate 
increases as the payer’s income increases, that is, individuals who earn high incomes have a 
greater proportion of their incomes taken to pay the tax. On the other hand, a regressive task 
is one whose rate increases as the payer’s income decreases.  
Afonso et al. (2008) found that the level of taxation and progressivity is the most 
direct factor in terms of Government impact on the distribution of income.  And with a 
correct progressive redistribution system, greater inequality automatically leads to more 
redistribution, even if no policy action is taken (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). 
According to Rodrigues and Arnold (2015), the tax and benefit system reduces the 
inequality. They concluded that the tax reforms helped in increasing the progressivity of the 
tax system. And the transfer payments (especially non-pension benefits) are also reducing 
the inequality. However, there is a series of adjustments that could strengthen the role of 
equalizing benefits system, which is usually biased towards benefits for seniors, while families 
with children should receive more support. According to these authors, without 
redistribution through taxes and transfers, inequality would be far greater, hence the 
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importance of public policies. For example, comparing Portugal with other OECD 
countries, these have stronger reductions in inequality through taxes and transfers. That is, 
this suggests that there are still things to be done to improve equity through social policies.  
Fiscal policy instruments can play a very important role in making income distribution 
more equal. According to Carter and Matthews (2012), it is very important to increase 
revenues to finance the public expenditure on transfers, education and health, that tend to 
favor families with low income. But fiscal policies cannot always achieve their goals: the study 
by Troiano (2017) shows that the introduction of some tax policy reforms generated income 
inequality in United States throughout the 20 th century, instead of promoting the correction 
that policy makers intended to. 
So, different instruments have different impacts on different countries, that produces 
different results. Most of the authors conclude that public spending and direct taxes 
reduce income inequality while indirect taxes increase inequality. And, it is expected that an 
increase of indirect taxes is regressive, but the overall impact of a tax policy can be 
progressive if these effects are to be compensated with benefits, that is, the distribution of 
the disposable income depends both the tax side and on the expenditure side. 
Another important notion, that is related with fiscal policy instruments and income 
inequality, is that of fiscal space. According to Botev et al. (2016) this is the gap between 
actual debt and estimated levels at which market access would become compromised. An 
increase in fiscal space means an increase of “room to maneuver”, fostering productivity and 
long-term growth (Botev et al., 2016). Odusola (2017) concludes that the relationship 
between fiscal space and the market and disposable Gini coefficients suggests that there is 
some tax regressivity. Both Gini coefficients are positively correlated with the fiscal space. 
In OECD countries, fiscal space has risen and structural reforms are key to help increasing 
fiscal space (Botev et al., 2016). Also, structural reforms that effectively contain the cost of 
healthcare and pension spending create additional space (Odusola, 2017). Taking countries 
in Africa, it can be concluded that there is a need to improve the progressivity of taxes in 
countries with large fiscal space and high income inequality and for this, it is necessary  get 
more revenues from personal and corporate income taxes. So, the progressivity of the direct 
and indirect taxes as well as an efficient and targeted public spending for education, health, 
agriculture are vehicles to reduce income inequality (Odusola, 2017).  According to Michal 
(2018), if there is fiscal space, more generous welfare transfers to families in need could 
mitigate the distributional consequences of recessions.  
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In the following sections, will be presented more detailed conclusions of the different 
instruments of fiscal policy (both on expenditure and revenue side). 
 
2.2. Taxes and income distribution 
The overall redistributive impact of taxes depends on the amount of taxes collected 
(size effect) and the progressivity of taxes. 
As we said before, the progressivity of taxes means that taxes must burden who has 
greater wealth, that is, it should be graduated according to the abilities of each person. In this 
case, the percentage of tax increases according to the capacity of the consumer - there are 
varying and increasing percentages. So, it’s to be hoped that the progressivity of taxes can 
help to combat inequality in income distribution (for example, income taxes tend to be 
progressive). 
In this section, first, we will analyze the impact of direct taxes and then the impact of 
indirect taxes on income inequality, following the explanation with some cases studied in the 
literature. 
In regards to direct taxes, Sung and Park (2011) state that the income taxes are usually 
the larger share of direct taxes, and as they have a very progressive structure they have a 
positive and strong redistributive income effect. 
Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012) and Cubero and Hollar (2010) show that personal 
income taxes (PIT) improve income distribution and this impact increases with more 
progressive tax structure. According to Akgun et al. (2017), these type of taxes represent the 
major role in determining inequality, although other types of taxes are also important. In line 
with this, according to Paulus et al. (2009), personal taxes have the largest redistributive 
impact in most of countries, but contrary to what would be generally expected, Paulus et al. 
(2009) found that Estonia does not show a drastically equalizing effect from personal income 
taxes. 
In relation to corporate income taxes (CIT), Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012) conclude 
that this type of taxes also improve income distribution, but this effect is reduced in open 
economies, that is,  this effect is smaller with more globalization. Akgun et al. (2017) conclude 
that, statistically, the effects of CIT on the distribution of income are very small.  
Ramos and Roca-Sagales (2008), Suoniemi et al. (2008), Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-
Sagales (2011) and Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagalés (2013) also show that direct taxes reduce 
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inequality due to the progressive structure, that is, an increase in direct taxes will produce a 
bigger redistributive effect and, consequently, lower inequality.  
However this impact of direct taxes on inequality is not linear across countries. While 
comparing the cases of Europe and Latin America, Goñi et al. (2011) show that direct taxes 
decrease income inequality. Yet, they also found that the impact of direct taxes is higher in 
Europe than in Latin America, that is, it reduces more the inequality in Europe than in Latin 
America. In contrast, Martinez-Vazquez and Vulovic (2014) show that, unlike most of 
countries, in Latin America (region that shows a considerable diversity in terms of tax 
structures), direct taxes don't play an important role in reducing inequality.  Accoding to 
Cubero and Hollar (2010), another exception case is Central America, especially Panama. In 
Central America, the tax systems are generally regressive and the degree of overall tax 
regressivity varies substantially across the countries. Particularly in Panama, where the 
income taxes considered are strongly progressive and account for a greater share of total tax 
revenue, their low tax rates in income results in a small redistributive effect.  
Now, regarding indirect taxes, Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012), show that the general 
consumption taxes have a negative impact on income distribution, increasing the income 
inequality, because “as indirect taxes are ultimately paid by consumers, and lower income groups spend a 
higher share of their incomes, relatively higher reliance on general sales taxes, excises and/or customs duties 
is generally expected to result in higher real income inequality” (Martínez-Vázquez et al., 2012, p. 23). 
Bastagli et al. (2012) and Koske et al. (2012) also show that indirect taxes, and particularly 
consumption taxes, tend to be regressive, increasing inequality. However, according to 
Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagalés (2013), indirect taxes don’t have a significant effect on 
inequality. Also, Sung and Park (2011) show that the effect of consumption taxes on 
redistribution is small and insignificant. 
Cubero and Hollar (2010) also found that Value Added Tax (VAT) is regressive, that 
is, tends to increase income inequality. Akgun et al. (2017) concluded that, statistically, the 
effects of VAT on income distribution are very small. But although VAT has no statistical 
relation with income inequality, it may have distributive consequences on consumption, 
being slightly progressive. Although, according to Sung and Park (2011), the VAT burden is 
the greatest among all the taxes and it is regressive, it does not have a redistributive effect 
because the VAT burden is nearly proportional.  
According to these ideas, Goñi et al. (2011) also show that the indirect taxes contribute 
to increase the inequality in income distribution (in line with most of the authors). Despite 
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their regressive effect, they also show that this impact is bigger in Europe than in Latin 
America. That is, in Europe it increases the income inequality more than in Latin America.  
Considering the aggregate effect of direct and indirect taxes, Ramos and Roca-Sagales 
(2008) show that the effect on inequality of direct taxes is offset by the effect of indirect 
taxes, that is, direct and indirect taxation have opposite effects on inequality. While revenues 
from indirect taxes are lower than those from direct taxes, indirect taxes have a larger effect 
on inequality due to their degree of regressivity compared with the progressivity of direct 
taxes. Another example is the study done by Goñi et al. (2011), that found that both in 
Europe and in Latin America, the impact of taxation on inequality is quite small because the 
regressiveness of indirect taxes neutralizes the progressive impact of direct taxes. 
According to most authors, a more egalitarian distribution of income requires a more 
progressive tax system, that is, it generally means that direct taxes need to be more important 
than indirect taxes in tax systems. However, in contrast with this, Martinez-Vazquez and 
Vulovic (2014) found that Latin America is an exception. In addition to having a more 
unequal distribution of income than the rest of the world, tax systems in Latin America for 
the most part have been found to be regressive and therefore adding to the inequality in 
income distribution (Martinez-Vazquez and Vulovic, 2014). 
 
2.3. Public spending and income distribution 
The overall impact of public spending on income distribution depends on the 
magnitude of social spending and its allocation across income groups. 
Ramos and Roca-Sagales (2008) conclude that an increase in public spending reduces 
inequality, being the effect of current spending much larger than that of public investment. 
In regards to current public expenditure, Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagales (2011) conclude 
that they reduce inequality because this type of spending includes different social spending 
with distributive implications through their immediate benefits.  
In contrast, Cevik and Correa-Caro (2015) found that, in China, government spending 
is a statistically significant factor with a worsening effect on the distribution of income.  This 
reflects the fact that the government spending in China is low and dominated by 
infrastructure investment and public administration. 
As for the functional classification of public spending, Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012) 
show that expenditures on health, education, social welfare and housing have positive 
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impacts on income distribution. They also conclude that the effects of expenditures on health 
and housing on reducing the income inequality are higher than those from expenditures on 
education and social protection.  
In accordance with Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012), Woo et al. (2013) and Paulus et al. 
(2009), also found that social benefits are associated with lower inequality. This positive 
contribution of government social benefits spending to income distribution may occur 
through two channels. First, part of social expenditure consists of direct transfers to the 
poorest, increasing their income and redistributing income from the richer to poorest. The 
second is that social expenditure may promote access for the poorest to higher degrees of 
education.  
In regards to speding on social protection, Cubero and Hollar (2010) found that public 
spending on social protection is regressive, due to the spending on pensions. They found 
that social insurance programs are regressive, that is, they contribute to increase the income 
inequality. They concluded that, if social security is excluded, social spending is progressive. 
Lindert et al. (2006) also found that spending on social protection is regressive due to a 
truncation in coverage due to requirements of membership in formal labor markets which 
exclude most the poor, and highly generous unit benefits for those in the upper quintiles.  
Regarding to health spending, Kyriacou et al. (2016) found that health spending has a 
strong impact on redistributive efficiency and Cubero and Hollar (2010) show that the 
distribution of public spending on health is progressive. In line with these authors, Bastagli 
et al. (2012) show that increases on public spending on health tend to decrease the inequality. 
Costa and Gartner (2017) show that if we invest more in health, we will have better reducing 
income inequality. So, in line with Bastagli et al. (2012) and Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012), 
Costa and Gartner (2017) conclude that spending on health generate positive externalities 
and can contribute to the reduction of income inequality. They show that primary health 
care, hospital and outpatient care have made greater gain in reducing income inequality.  
Now, regarding to education, Bastagli et al. (2012) show that increases on public 
spending on education tend to decrease the inequality. Ths is in line with Martínez-Vázquez 
et al. (2012) that also concluded that a higher average education level implies a more equal 
income distribution. Also, according to Woo et al. (2013), the education is significantly 
associated with lower inequality (a 1 percent increase in the average years of schooling is 
associated with about 0.04-0.12 percent reduction in inequality). 
In contrast, there are authors that found that public spending on education may 
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increase the income inequality. Glomm and Ravikumar (2003) conclude that if the quality of 
schools for all individuals does not change, income inequality may even increase because 
there are other factors that contribute to the evolution of income inequality, such as the 
initial conditions of income distribution and public policy. Greater initial income inequality 
increases income inequality in the future: according to these authors, self-selection leads to 
inequality as there is a tendency for the richer to choose the best schools’ districts (for 
example). According to these authors, individuals whose parents have low human capital 
allocate less time to learn. Also, according to Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagales (2011) an 
increase in initial educational inequality increases income inequality.  
On the other hand, Afonso et al. (2010) and Kyriacou et al. (2016) find that education 
spending does not significantly affects income distribution. They conclude that public 
spending in education affects income distribution but the most important factor is, though, 
education achievement. That is, a better education allows better monitoring and control over 
the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure, thus promoting a more equal income 
distribution (Afonso et al., 2010). 
To improve the income distribution equality, Rodrigues and Arnold (2015) found that 
the education system should provide more support to students with greater difficulties to 
decrease the rate of rejection and abandonment. Also, increasing the number of students per 
class would be a reasonable way to generate savings without affecting much of the learning 
progress. The expansion of vocational training courses and adult education, including in the 
context of active policies, can improve the ability of many homes to generate income and 
lead to a more equitable distribution of income. (Rodrigues and Arnold , 2015). For example, 
in Portugal, the fraction of household heads with less than upper secondary education is 
remarkably large (82.5%). The remaining groups, upper secondary and tertiary education, 
account for less than 10% of the sample each (Budria, 2007). That is, there are still many 
people who have a low degree of education. Michal (2018) show that the effect of education 
is related to the increased proportion of the population with tertiary education, that is, an 
increasing share of people with tertiary education have inequality-increasing effects. 
To prove some theoretical mechanisms explained previously, will be presented an 
example. Goñi et al. (2011) compare two groups of different countries: Europe and Latin 
America. They concluded that in the European countries public transfers reduce the degree 
of inequality of income while in Latin America the transfers do not have a large effect on 
inequality because: i) in Latin America, the volume of transfers is much lower than in Europe, 
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and ii) a certain amount of segmentation leads to less progressive transfers in Latin America 
than in Europe. Lustig and Pereira (2016) also analyze inequality in income distribution in 
Latin America where countries are very different in regards to government-size and the 
structure of expenditure and they concluded that public spending on education and health 
have a more important role than other transfers in reducing inequality. Kyriacou et al. (2016) 
and Cubero and Hollar (2010)). Moreover, Lustig and Pereira (2016) found that there is a 
much larger portion of public expenditure dedicated to education and health spending 
compared to that on cash transfers. While in Brazil (that has the largest spending on health 
and education in Latin America) the size of the Government's budget is not a constraint on 
redistributive measures, in Ecuador, Mexico and Peru it would be important to create 
sufficient revenues to increase social spending. 
The targeting of spending is also an important topic.  
Following Chu et al. (2000), the government spending is considered to be well targeted 
if the poorest quintile’s (bottom quintile) share of benefits from such spending is larger than 
the richest quintile (top quintile). This means that the poorest 20 percent benefit more than 
the richest 20 percent, in absolute terms. The government spending is considered to be 
progressive (regressive) if the benefits to the bottom quintile are larger (smaller) than the 
benefits to the top quintile, relative to their income or expenditure. So, with progressive 
(regressive) spending, benefits represent a smaller fraction of income or expenditure at a 
higher income or expenditure quintiles (Chu et al., 2000). So, we can say that, if spending is 
well targeted, it will be progressive, but progressive spending may not be well targeted. And 
if spending is poorly targeted, it may be progressive or regressive. 
According to Cubero and Hollar (2010), improving the targeting of social spending 
can result in a considerable reduction in inequality. For example, in the case of Nicaragua, 
the impact of an increase in social spending on the income of the poorest quintile would 
double if the current pattern of absolute regressivity of social spending was improved to at 
least a flat distribution. 
According to Chu et al. (2000), education, health and transfer programs in developing 
countries show a progressive incidence, but many of them are not well targeted. All primary 
and secondary education programs, but only half of the tertiary education programs, assessed 
exhibited a progressive incidence. The targeting, however, was less effective. While all health 
programs were progressive, only half of them were well targeted (Chu et al., 2000).  
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According to Bastagli et al. (2012) people with low income have lack of access to 
important services in terms of education and health. Aggregate education and health 
spending is regressive in many developing economies. However, increases in in-kind 
spending to finance the expansion of basic health services and education are likely to be 
progressively distributed more than existing spending (Bastagli et al., 2012). In some OECD 
countries, cash transfers have a small size but are highly targeted to individuals who are worse 
off (OECD, 2012). Elsewhere, large cash transfers (that represent more than three quarters 
of the global impact on inequality) redistribute income mostly over the life cycle rather than 
through individuals (OECD, 2012). 
But, even if spending on education is progressive, the distributional effects on different 
levels of education differ sharply. For example, in Central America public spending on 
primary education is in favour of the poor, that is, it is progressive. By contrast, spending on 
tertiary education is very regressive (Cubero and Hollar, 2010). 
 
2.4. Fiscal Policy and income inequality: Some empirical 
evidence 
The effectiveness of income distribution is thus, according to the literature, largely  
affected by taxes and public spending. Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012) analyze the joint effect 
of taxes and public spending on income inequality and, although weak, their results point to 
a complementarity between the fiscal redistribution tools on the expenditure and revenue 
sides. Ramos and Roca-Sagales (2008) and Furceri et al. (2018) conclude that the effects of 
taxes on income inequality are much smaller than that of expenditures, being the effect of 
public transfers the one with stronger impact on income inequality.  
The redistributive impact of taxes and public spending depends on the size, mix and 
the progressivity of each component and, hence, the impact of fiscal policy on income 
inequality may differ from country to country, depending on the design and composition: 
some countries have lower taxes and small welfare systems, but achieve the same 
redistributive impact as countries that have higher taxes and more costly welfare systems. 
Following, will be presented some evidence of the impact of fiscal policy on inequality in 
various countries and areas, both developed economies and developing economies.  
In line with the authors mencioned before, Bastagli et al. (2012) concluded that, in 
developed economies, most of the redistributive impact of fiscal policies is achieved through 
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the government spending side, although taxes also have an important role in many countries.  
Goñi et al. (2011), through the analysis of 15 developed European Union economies,2 have 
also concluded that public spending, particularly transfers, play a much more important role 
than taxes in decreasing inequality.   
Wang and Caminada (2014) argue that in most OECD countries, the gap between 
richer and poorer has widened over the past decades. They found that the most important 
driver was the greater inequality in wages and salaries. Immervoll and Richardson (2011) 
conclude that in these countries benefits, like for example unemployment benefits and 
incapacity benefits, have a much stronger impact on inequality than social contributions or 
taxes do, what is in line with other authors (e.g., Bastagli et al. (2012). Despite the increasing 
size of the direct taxes, the impact that benefits have on inequality is stronger than that of 
social contributions and taxes because the benefits offer a support for people who have a 
lower income. So, it is expected that changes on benefits have a more significant impact in 
global distribution and the degree of inequality. “Several OECD countries have recently faced severe 
budgetary pressures, particularly on governments’ social retirement and health care finance systems. Public 
policy has considerable influence on the distribution of income in society” (Suoniemi et al., 2008, p. 8).  
However, the progressivity and the size effect of taxes and transfers are also relevant 
variables for developed countries. For instance, in Australia taxes and transfers are smaller 
but more progressive than the OECD average, while in Germany taxes and transfers are 
larger but less progressive than the OECD average (Joumard et al., 2012). In Finland, 
Suoniemi et al. (2008) conclude that, the increase in income inequality is due to the decline 
in income progressivity and to the increasing shares of income from capital. The latter is the 
main source of the increase in income inequality. 
Now, regarding to developing economies, Cubero and Hollar (2010) found that, 
similarly to developed economies, social spending has a more redistributive impact than taxes 
(in line with Ramos and Roca-Sagales (2008) and Furceri et al. (2018)). They found that in 
Central America, available data suggest that the net redistributive effect of fiscal policy is 
modestly progressive. While taxation has a small regressive effect, social spending has a larger 
progressive impact, thus yielding a progressive net effect.  
However, Krstic (2016) found that in Serbia taxes and benefits policies reduced 
income inequality, but their impact is low compared to developed economies. This relatively 
                                                 
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands,  
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
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modest redistributive role of direct taxes and social transfers is due to the low coverage of 
social transfers and the very low progressivity of Serbian personal tax system (Krstić, 2016). 
Similar conclusions were presented by Goñi et al. (2011) as regards some Latin American 
countries.3 The authors found that the redistributive impact of taxation and transfers is larger 
in developed Europe Union countries than in Latin America. The main reason, according to 
Goñi et al. (2011), is that Latin America makes a “bad” fiscal redistribution due to the low 
volume of resources collected and transferred, to the fact that collection is regressive and 
transfers are barely directed. Lustig and Pereira (2016) also emphasized this “bad” fiscal 
redistribution in Latin America, manly because social transfers go, ultimately, to the richest, 
being most regressive. 
Bastagli et al. (2012) also show that the impact of fiscal policies in developing 
economies is restricted to low overall levels of both taxes and transfers. Chu et al. (2000) 
show that developing countries do not have adequate redistributive programs to achieve a 
post-tax, post-transfer income equality comparable to that in industrial countries.  Michal 
(2018), found that, during the Great Recession of 2009-2010, the Gini coefficient has 
increased in countries like Bulgaria and Hungary. According to the author, this worsening of 
the income distribution in Hungary and in Bulgaria was related to policy changes that made 
the tax and benefit system less redistributive. 
In contrast with most of the authors, Odusola (2017) found that, in China, the taxes 
reduce the income inequality while government spending increase income inequality. Also, 
Cevik and Correa-Caro (2015) showed that, in China, government spending and taxation 
have opposing effects on income inequality. While government spending appears to have a 
worsening impact, taxation improves income distribution.  Also focusing on an Asiatic 
country, Korea, Sung and Park (2011), found that direct taxes, in-kind benefits and social 
security contributions reduced income inequality by 13.8 percent in 2007. Yet, they found 
that indirect taxes, as consumption taxes, have a small or even positive effect on inequality. 
These differences in a similar group of countries were also observed in Latin America. 
While, according to Lustig and Pereira (2016), Brazil and Uruguay have decreased income 
inequality essentially through direct taxes and transfers, in Ecuador, indirect taxes have had 
a large effect on promoting income equality. They also found that in Costa Rica, Brazil and 
Ecuador, public spending on health and education were relevant to reduce income inequality. 
                                                 
3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
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According to Lustig and Pereira (2016), all these countries vary in terms of impact of 
redistributive tax policies and this variation is not always correlated with size, “perhaps the most 
interesting finding is that equity may matter more than size .” (Lustig and Pereira, 2016, p. 133). So 
we can conclude that even within similar group of countries, different countries have 
different types of spending and revenues and fiscal policies have different impacts on 
inequality. 
Summing-up, in Table 1 and Table 2 are presented the main conclusions. We can 
conclude that in developed economies, fiscal policies have a stronger impact, and the 
spending side instruments play a much more important rule in reducing the income 
inequality. But, regarding to developing economies, evidence is mixed, being the conclusions 
different across countries (as we can see on the Table 1 presented below), and the fiscal 
policies in these countries tend to be less redistributive.  
 
Table 1: Revenue Side vs. Spending Side - Developing Economies 
 
Developing 
Economies 
Revenue Side Spending Side Author(s) 
Brazil 
(2009-2011) 
Direct taxes 
decrease income 
inequality 
Spending on health 
and education 
decrease the income 
inequality 
Lustig and Pereira 
(2016) 
Ecuador 
(2009-2011) 
Indirect taxes 
decrease income 
inequality 
Spending on health 
and education 
decrease the income 
inequality 
Lustig and Pereira 
(2016) 
Costa Rica 
(2009-2011) 
- Spending on health 
and education 
decrease the income 
inequality 
Lustig and Pereira 
(2016) 
Uruguay 
(2009-2011) 
Direct taxes 
decrease income 
inequality 
Government 
spending decrease 
income inequality 
Lustig and Pereira 
(2016) 
China 
(1990-2014) 
Taxes decrease the 
income inequality 
 
Government 
spending increase 
income inequality 
Odusola (2017) 
Cevik and Correa-
Caro (2015) 
 
Serbia 
(2013) 
Direct taxes 
decrease income 
inequality 
Government 
spending decrease 
income inequality 
Krstic (2016) 
Korea 
(2007) 
Direct taxes and 
SSC decrease 
income inequality 
- Sung and Park 
(2011) 
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Central America 
(2004-2008) 
Taxes increase 
income inequality 
Government 
spending decrease 
income inequality 
Goñi et al. (2011) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Revenue Side vs. Spending Side - Developed Economies 
 
Developing 
Economies 
Revenue Side Spending Side Author(s) 
15 European 
Union economies 
(2004-2008) 
Taxes decrease 
income inequality 
Government 
spending decrease 
income inequality 
Goñi et al. (2011) 
OECD countries 
(1979-2005) 
Taxes decrease 
income inequality 
Government 
spending decrease 
income inequality 
Bastagli et al. (2012) 
Australia 
(2000-2009) 
Taxes decrease 
income inequality 
Government 
spending decrease 
income inequality 
(Joumard et al. 
(2012). 
Germany 
(2000-2009) 
Taxes decrease 
income inequality 
Government 
spending decrease 
income inequality 
(Joumard et al. 
(2012). 
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3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Methodology 
With the purpose of analyzing the impact of taxes and public expenditure on income 
inequality, we will use a vector autoregressive model (VAR). The VAR model is commonly 
used, among others, to assess fiscal multipliers, i.e., the impact of fiscal shocks on real income, 
which we propose to extend with an additional variable capturing income inequality. 
This method is used in the modeling of time prediction systems that are interrelated, 
thus providing an important analysis of the impact of random shocks on the variables 
included in the system. This model is also appropriate to estimate medium and long term 
impacts of fiscal policies because it allows for dynamic feedback between variables. In 
addition, VAR models are proper when variables of interest are endogenous, as is that case 
with tax revenue, public expenditure, output and inequality that are interconnected. So, we 
will follow the methodology used by Ramos and Roca-Sagales (2008), but we will use data 
from two groups of countries in the EMU: i) Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Greece and Spain, the 
PIIGS countries and ii) France, Netherlands, Germany, Austria  and Finland, grouped as the 
Core countries, for a period of available data of 20 years (1996-2016). We aim at analyzing 
the impact of the different components of public revenue and expenditure on income 
inequality (and on output), whereas available related literature either treats public spending 
and taxes as a whole or relies on economic, and not functional, disaggregation of public 
expenditures. However, the components of the expenditure and revenue side may have 
different effects on the output and on the income inequality. For example, direct and indirect 
taxes influence inequality differently, since they differ in terms of the level of taxation and 
progressiveness. Thus, unlike most studies done, we will consider the various components 
of the revenue and expenditure side to separate effects, which may operate in opposite 
directions. Moreover, different types of expenditure, namely disaggregated by function are 
expected to have different impacts on inequality, namely education and social spending when 
compared to general government expenditures. 
The benchmark model includes GDP, government spending and revenue and income 
inequality (measured by the Gini disposable income coefficient). This model is extended to 
also include fiscal variables in disaggregated form: government spending is split into social 
protection, general public services, education, health, economic affairs and a residual 
category (other), and government revenues include direct taxes, indirect taxes and social 
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security contributions. The inclusion of a measure of inequality in the VAR specification 
allows a joint analysis of the macroeconomic and distributional effects of fiscal policy.  
 
3.1.1. VAR methodology: theoretical elements 
The vector autoregressive (VAR) is commonly used to estimate systems of interrelated 
time series and for analyzing the dynamic impact of random disturbances on the system of 
variables.  
𝑿𝒕,𝒊 = ∑ 𝑴𝒊𝑿𝒕−𝒊 + 𝒆𝒕
𝒌
𝒊=𝟏  (3.1.1.1) 
 
where  
 X is a vector of size n which includes the endogenous variables of interest 
(government spending, government revenue, Gini coefficient and GDP),  
  𝑀𝑖 is a nxn matrix of coefficients to be estimated, 
 k represents the number of lags introduced in the model, 
 Et is a nx1 white noise innovation process, with E(𝑒𝑡)=0, E(𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡′)=𝑒 , 
E(𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑠′)=0 for ts, 
 t denotes the time trend, 
 i represents the country. 
 
According to Hebous (2010), the inclusion of the vector of residuals allows us to 
capture three distinct effects: the responses of discretionary fiscal policy, automatic stabilizers 
and random discretionary fiscal policy responses. The latter is what the structural fiscal shock 
is meant to capture. 
The structural VAR model takes the following form: 
 
𝑨𝟎𝑿𝒕 = ∑ 𝑨𝒊𝑿𝒕−𝒊 + 𝑩𝒗𝒕
𝒌
𝒊=𝟏  (3.1.1.2) 
where 
 𝐴0 represents a matrix that describes the contemporaneous relationships 
among the variables in the vector 𝑋𝑡 , 
 B represents a matrix that describes the relation between the reduced form 
residuals 𝑒𝑡 and the structural form residuals 𝑣𝑡 . Being that: 
𝒗𝒕 = 𝑩
−𝟏𝑨𝟎𝒆𝒕  (3.1.1.3) 
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The dynamics of the variables after a one unit increase in the current value of the 
structural residual in the fiscal equation holding all other variables fixed – structural fiscal 
shock - can be summarized in the impulse responses of the variables included in the system. 
The main challenge when using a VAR methodology to estimate and predict how fiscal 
policy affects economic activity and/or inequality goes through the identification of the 
structural shocks, isolating all the factors that can influence the mechanism of transmission 
to the economic activity. 
 Following the work done by Hebous (2010), there are four approaches in the 
literature to solve this problem. 
The first approach to solve this issue corresponds to the so-called recursive 
formulation (Cholesky decomposition). In this method, the first variable included in the 
system only responds to exogenous shocks on itself, implying that it does not respond to 
contemporary demand shocks. The second variable responds to shocks of the first variable 
and to their own, while the third variable responds to shocks of the first two variables and 
their own shock and so on, depending on whether to expand the number of variables in the 
system. In this case, we have four variables, but the procedure is the same. The order of the 
variables is crucial, since it will be this order that will establish the causal relationship between 
the different variables, although there is no specific rule about such ordering.  
The matrix can reproduce the ordering referred to as follows, e.g., 
[
𝟏 𝟎 𝟎 𝟎
𝒂𝟐𝟏 𝟏 𝟎 𝟎
𝒂𝟑𝟏 𝒂𝟑𝟐 𝟏 𝟎
𝒂𝟒𝟏 𝒂𝟒𝟐 𝒂𝟒𝟑 𝟏
] [
𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈
𝒆𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕
𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚
𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒙𝒆𝒔
] = [
𝟏 𝟎 𝟎 𝟎
𝟎 𝟏 𝟎 𝟎
𝟎 𝟎 𝟏 𝟎
𝟎 𝟎 𝟎 𝟏
] [
𝒗𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈
𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕
𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚
𝒗𝒕𝒂𝒙𝒆𝒔
] (3.1.1.4) 
 
The second approach is known as the approach of structural identification proposed 
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), in which it is argued that it is possible to identify some 
elements of the matrix B−1A0 through the study of tax and expenditure elasticities in relation 
to the product. These elasticities correspond to certain elements in the matrix A0 . In this 
case, after being estimated the elasticities, the values are included in the VAR model.  
The third approach is called as sign restriction. In this approach it is no longer 
necessary to enforce the absence of contemporary effects on some variables, what was 
happening in the approaches explained previously, but rather required the establishment of 
restrictions on the signal of impulse responses of the fiscal variables. Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009) divided possible shocks between fiscal and non-fiscal, in which the last set are the 
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business cycle shocks and monetary policy, while in the first are the shocks on the expense 
and public revenue. The signs were only applied to the second set of shocks, having been 
established that the business cycle has a positive impact on public spending, product, 
consumption and investment by non-residents, not being applied to any restriction on sign 
of public expenditure. 
Finally, the fourth approach is the inclusion of dummy variables in the model, and 
the response to the shock is measured through the reaction of the dummy variables. The 
new reduced form VAR is: 
𝑿𝒕 = ∑𝒊=𝟏
𝒌 𝑴𝒊𝑿𝒕−𝒊 + ∑𝒋=𝟎
𝒍 𝑫𝒋𝒅𝒕−𝒋 + 𝒆𝒕 (3.1.1.5) 
where j is the lag order associated with the dummy d and D is the associated matrix of 
coefficients. The disadvantage of this approach is that other fiscal shocks of different 
propositions might have occurred parallel to the identified episodes (Hebous, 2010).  
To the identification of the fiscal shock we follow the Cholesky decomposition (see, 
for example, Ramos and Roca-Sagales, 2008). 
So, in our benchmark model, and closely following the methodology in Ramos and 
Roca-Sagales (2008), we assume that: (i) public expenditure does not react 
contemporaneously to shocks to the other system variables, that is, public spending is 
exogenous on impact - for example, on impact, output responds to changes in public 
spending but public spending does not respond to changes in output; (ii) the output is 
contemporaneously affected by shocks in public spending, but does not react 
contemporaneously to shocks in inequality or taxation - that is, on impact, taxation and 
inequality respond to changes in output but output does not respond to changes in tax 
revenues and inequality; (iii) inequality is contemporaneously affected by shocks in public 
spending and in output, but does not react contemporaneously to shocks in taxation;  (iv) tax 
revenue are affected by all system variables, that is, changes in output, public expenditure 
and inequality affect the taxation. 
This set of assumptions about the contemporary relationship between the variables 
is assumed to dominate the effects of demand, which justifies the contemporary effect of 
public expenditure in the output. However, the reverse is not plausible since most of the 
non-government spending is related to the business cycle (Ramos and Roca-Sagales, 2008). 
Due to the lags of implementation caused by budgetary process, public spending decisions 
are taken before the public sector obtains the information about the actual performance of 
the economy. The changes in public spending can have an immediate impact on the income 
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of individuals and on the distribution of income. Also, consumption and investment 
decisions of agents are not immediate, being dependent on the policies pursued by the 
government. 
According to Ramos and Roca-Sagalés (2008), in the very short term, changes in the 
tax base are the only likely source of changes in the tax revenue, and changes in output or 
distributional changes change the tax base. Therefore, we assume that tax revenue reacts 
contemporaneously to inequality and output shocks. For instance, changes in the 
unemployment rate due to changes in income affects inequality and that affects the tax base 
and even the medium tax rate. Moreover, a discretionary change in tax rates (namely in direct 
taxes) only impact on income, and thus on inequality in the following period.  
Summing up, the ordering that results from the above-mentioned assumptions, for 
the benchmark model specification is: 
Figure 1: Cholesky ordering in the benchmark model 
 
 
 
In what regards revenue side, we assume that direct taxes revenue does affect 
contemporaneously indirect tax revenue, but does not react contemporaneously to shocks 
to indirect tax revenue. That is, shocks to direct taxes alters disposable income, which in turn 
may lead to consumption changes, and thus changes in the revenue from indirect taxation. 
Hence the ordering of the tax variables is: direct taxes, social security contributions and 
indirect taxes. This is in line with Ramos and Roca-Sagalés (2008). 
 
Figure 2: Cholesky ordering of revenue-side variables 
 
 
 
In regards to expenditure side, we assume that the ordering is: social protection, 
education, health, general public services, economic affairs and other government spending. 
To the best of our knowledge, the literature is absent on the ordering of functional segments 
of public expenditure and the results are rather robust irrespectively of the ordering.  
 
Public spending Output Inequality Tax revenue
Diect Taxes
Social Security 
Contributions
Indirect Taxes
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Figure 3: Cholesky ordering of expenditure-side variables 
 
Since data is annual, a time lag of one period was chosen to model the VAR. 
 
3.2. Data and variables 
This section provides a summary description of the data used in the empirical analysis.  
We use annual data for 1995-2016. The macroeconomic series were obtained from 
Eurostat4 and from OECD database5 and expressed in real terms, in millions of euros. 
In addition, fiscal variables follow a functional classification and are obtained from the 
OECD database.6 On the expenditure side, we consider spending on social protection, 
general public services, education, health, economic affairs and other. The latter includes 
spending on defense, public order and safety, environment protection, housing and 
community amenities and spending on recreation, culture and religion. On the revenue side, 
we distinguish between direct tax revenue (taxes on income, profits and capital; taxes on 
playroll and workforce; and recurrent taxes on immovable), indirect tax revenue (recurrent 
taxes on net wealth; estate, inheritance and gift taxes; taxes on financial and capital; non-
recurrent taxes on property; other recurrent taxes on property; taxes on goods and services; 
and other taxes) and social security contributions (SSC). In addition to the fiscal variables, 
traditionally defined as endogenous, we will also use the Gini income coefficient, obtained 
from Eurostat7, together with GDP, obtained from the OECD database. 
We aim at calculating the income and the inequality multipliers in the short and the 
long term, providing assessment of the impact on GDP and on Gini coefficient from a unit 
increase in public spending, for example.  
For the sample horizon (1995-2016), average government spending represented about 
45% of GDP in PIIGS and 50% of GDP in the core countries. In the PIIGS (core), 16% 
(21%) of GDP was devoted to social protection spending, 8% (7%) of GDP to spending on 
                                                 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database , accessed in april 2018. 
5 http://stats.oecd.org, accessed in april 2018. 
6 http://stats.oecd.org, accessed in april 2018. 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, accessed in april 2018. 
Social 
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general public services, 4% (5%) of GDP was education spending, 6% (7%) of GDP 
corresponded to health spending, 5% (5%) of GDP was to spending in economic affairs and 
6% (6%) of GDP corresponded to other government spending. In regards to government 
revenues, these represented 37% of GDP in PIIGS and 39% of GDP in core countries. In 
PIIGS (core), 12% (12%) of GDP represented revenues from direct taxes, 13% (14%) of 
GDP represented revenue from indirect taxes and 11% (13%) of GDP were social security 
contributions. 
All variables are presented in constant prices. We converted all fiscal variables in 
constant prices through using the GDP deflator indexed 100 in 2010. 
The designations presented in Table 1, below, correspond to the final name of the 
variables in the model estimated in Eviews10, after making the first differences of the variables 
in logs in order to make them stationary. 
 
Table 3: Variable labeling 
 
Social Protection G_SOCIAL_PROTECTION 
General Public Services G_GENERAL 
Education G_EDUCATION 
Health G_HEALTH 
Economic Affairs G_ECO_AFFAIRS 
Others Government Spending G_OTHERS 
Output G_GDP 
Gini Coefficient G_GINI 
Direct Taxes G_TDIR 
Indirect Taxes G_TIND 
Social Security Contributions G_SSC 
 
 
Tables 1A and 2A in annex, present the average value of each variable. Corresponding 
mean, maximum and minimum values are presented as well. For each variable, there are 110 
observations for the analysis. 
Through the analysis of the Gini descriptive statistics, and comparing PIIGS with core 
countries, we can conclude that the first exhibit higher income inequality: PIIGS exhibit an 
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average Gini of 0.33 while the average for the core countries is of 0.27. Can different use of 
fiscal policy instruments be a source for inequality differences in the two groups of countries? 
In terms of the empirical implementation, we start by determining the order of 
integration of the variables. Unit root tests are performed to check whether a time series 
variable is non-stationary. A series is said to be stationary if the mean and autocovariances 
of the series do not depend on time. There are different types of unit root tests that we will 
use: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test and Im, Pesaran 
and Shin W-stat. They are appropriate for panel data. 
So, unit root assessment is based on three different tests. Results are presented in Table 
2, below for variables in first difference. In the unit root tests, we included in test equation 
only the individual intercept and no trend. As we can see on the table below, most of the 
variables are stationary in first differences of log-levels. 
 
Table 4: Unit Root Tests with no intercept and no trend 
 
 PIIGS Core countries 
Variable Im, 
Pesaran 
and Shin 
W-stat 
ADF – 
Fisher 
Chi-
square 
PP – 
Fisher 
Chi 
square 
Im, 
Pesaran 
and Shin 
W-stat 
ADF – 
Fisher 
Chi-
square 
PP – 
Fisher 
Chi 
square 
Social Protection 0.0188 0.0353 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Education 0.0611 0.1173 0.0017 0.0080 0.0131 0.0007 
Health 0.3591 0.5658 0.1001 0.0388 0.0454 0.0000 
General Public 
Services 
0.0091 0.0169 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Economic Affairs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Others Spending 0.0089 0.0174 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Direct Taxes 0.0004 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Indirect Taxes 0.0026 0.0069 0.0000 0.0033 0.0034 0.0019 
Social Security 
Contributions 
0.0013 0.0014 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Gini  0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
GDP 0.0597 0.1004 0.0536 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 
 
Through the analysis of the table presented above, we can see that, in PIIGS, the 
probability of the government spending on health be non-stationary is high. So, we did the 
unit root test but on the equation we did not include the intercept and the results obtained 
are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 5: Unit Root Test of Health in PIIGS with trend and no intercept 
 
Variable Levin, Lin & Chu 
t* 
ADF – Fisher Chi-
square 
PP – Fisher Chi 
square 
Health 0.0002 0.0134 0.0013 
 
Results in Table 3 show that the probability of the health spending being non-
stationary is low. So, in order to estimate the VAR model, we consider the first differences 
of log-levels to all variables. Note that we try to estimate the VAR model using the second 
differences of logs of spending on health but the results remained the same, so we use the 
first the differences of logs because of the interpretation. 
We consider the effects on the growth rate of output and on the growth rate of income 
inequality of a one-off one percentage point shock in the growth rate of the fiscal policy 
variable. 
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4. Analysis of  the results 
In this section, we present and analyze the results obtained in the estimation of the 
VAR models. Whenever possible, a comparison will be established between our results  and 
those obtained in the revised literature. 
First, we will analyze the impulse responses of the Gini coefficient and the GDP to 
alternative fiscal shocks, as well as, the link between output and income inequality, and then, 
we will compute the related multipliers. 
Moreover, we will assess the impact of different types of public expenditure and tax 
revenue on GDP and on income inequality, in the PIIGS countries, comparing with the core 
EMU countries. 
 
4.1. Impulse response functions 
Our estimates of the effects of fiscal policies are based on the impulse response 
functions, which result from the VAR estimation. A shock to the i-th variable not only 
directly affects the i-th variable but is also transmitted to all the other endogenous variables 
through the dynamic structure of the VAR. An impulse response function traces the effect 
of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of the 
endogenous variables. So, the impulse response functions reveal the mechanisms through 
which a given shock spreads over time. 
If the innovations 𝜖𝑡 are contemporaneously uncorrelated, interpretation of the impulse 
response is straightforward. The i-th innovation 𝜖𝑖 ,𝑡 is simply a shock to the i-th endogenous 
variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 . Innovations are, however, usually correlated, and may be viewed as having a 
common component which cannot be associated with a specific variable. In order to 
interpret the impulses, we will apply a transformation P to the innovations so that they 
become uncorrelated: 
𝒖𝒕 = 𝑷𝝐𝒕  ~ (𝟎,𝑫) (4.1.1) 
where D is a diagonal covariance matrix. 
The impulse and cumulative impulse response functions are important for measuring 
the impact of fiscal policies in both the short term and the medium and long term.  
We will start our analysis by running impulse response functions of Gini coefficient and 
GDP to shocks in overall government expenditure and revenue and, in particular, to shocks 
in the following variables: social protection spending, education spending, health spending, 
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spending on economic affairs, other public spending, indirect taxes, direct taxes and social 
security contributions. 
We will firstly test the response of Gini in subsection 4.1.1 and, secondly, we will test 
the response of GDP in 4.1.2. In subsection 4.1.3 we will  analyze the link between output 
and income inequality. 
 
4.1.1. Impulse responses of income inequality to fiscal 
shocks 
In the Figures to follow, we plot the cumulative impulse responses of the growth in the 
Gini coefficient to selected fiscal shocks to which responses were, at least, point significant. 
Time horizon extends to 10 periods (10 years ahead). 
 
Figure 4: Cumulative response function of Gini to SSC, PIIGS 
 
Starting with the group of PIIGS, and in regards to revenue shocks, only the response 
to Social Security Contributions is statistically significant in the short run and its effect on 
income inequality is positive, that is, it increases the Gini coefficient , increasing income 
inequality. Inequality increases continuously with increasing of SSC. This is in line with 
Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012), that show that the SSC can be regressive, representing most 
of pretax income for low-income workers. That is, increases in SSC tend to be regressive in 
PIIGS, increasing income inequality.  
SSC may represent profit deviations towards low-income workers (an increase in firm’s 
costs may lead to higher unemployment) or a change in after-tax labor income for the 
workers, and it is usually regressive in most cases; so, an increase in social security 
contributions reduces disposable income of households and that may contribute to increase 
income inequality. Also in line with our non-significant results for the medium run on the 
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growth rate of the Gini coefficient, according to Paulus et al., (2009), social security 
contributions have the smallest equalizing effect, given that it is not their main purpose.  
On the other hand, not in line with our results, Sung and Park (2011) show that an 
increase in SSC reduces income inequality.  
In what regards the Core countries, and on revenue side, none of the fiscal variables 
appears to be statistically significant to income inequality. 
 
Figure 5: Cumulative response function of Gini to selected government spending 
side variables, PIIGS 
 
Looking at the expenditure side, in PIIGS, and in spite of education spending exhibits 
a slightly non-significant effect on income inequality, it tends to reduce income inequality. 
This is in line with most of the literature (e.g. Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012) and Bastagli et 
al. (2012)). 
Also, as we can see from Figure 5, other government spending is statistically significant 
and exhibits a negative effect on income inequality, reducing income inequality. This can be 
justified because “Other” government spending includes, among others, housing spending. 
So, by increasing disposable income of the poorest families, this is expected to make income 
inequality to decrease. This conclusions are in line with Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012) and 
Kyriacou et al. (2015).  
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Figure 6: Cumulative response function of Gini to selected government spending 
side variables, Core countries 
 
 
In Core countries, the spending on social protection has a negative impact on income 
inequality: an increase on the spending on social protection decreases the Gini coefficient, 
decreasing income inequality (one period decrease in the Gini growth rate, and permanently 
decrease income inequality). This is in line with other authors (e.g. Martínez-Vázquez et al. 
(2012)). Niedzwiedz et al. (2016) also found that spending on social protection decreases the 
income inequality. They also found that decisions on the level of investment in social 
protection may have implications for the disadvantages groups. That is, the countries that 
invest more in specific types of social protection can be more efficient, reducing inequalities. 
Regarding to social protection, we can say that this can intensify the long-term 
economic growth with reducing unacceptable levels of inequality and possible negative 
impacts of wrong choices of policies on the lack of social cohesion or on public disruption. 
The poor people are more frequently the most vulnerable to the risks of all kinds (lack of 
food for example). A high level of inequality, allied with the absence of adequate social 
protection mechanisms, threatens social cohesion and political stability. The social and 
economic role of social protection began to be seen more positively and has been recognized 
as a means of risk-sharing in face of economic headwinds, and as a collective tool to mitigate 
the effects of the growing social inequality. So it is an important topic to take into account. 
Still about government spending, and unlike the case of PIIGS countries, education 
spending in core countries tends to exhibit a positive impact on the Gini coefficient, that is 
increasing education spending tends to increase income inequality, although not statistically 
significant. This is in line with Cubero and Hollar (2010), and with Lustig (2017) and it may 
reflect the preverse evidence of a decrease in education spending as higher-income students 
increased demand towards private education system. 
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4.1.2. Impulse responses of output to fiscal shocks 
Figures in this subsection show the cumulative impulse response functions of the 
growth in GDP to the alternative shocks in fiscal variables. As in the case of income 
inequality reactions, we first look at the revenue side and, then, at the expenditure side. 
Impulse responses have a 10-year horizon. 
Figure 7: Cumulative response functions of GDP to selected government revenue 
side variables, PIIGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In regards to revenue side and starting with the PIIGS, we can see that, direct taxes 
have a positive effect on GDP, contrary to most of the literature, e.g., Muinelo-Gallo and 
Roca-Sagalés (2013) and Goñi et al. (2011) and Martinez-Vazquez and Vulovic (2014), argues 
and that concludes that direct taxes have a negative and significant effect on growth, that is, 
it can produce significant reductions in the growth of GDP. Our results also show that 
indirect taxes and SSC also have a positive impact on growth. These conclusion about the 
PIIGS, regarding to tax revenue are not in line with Afonso and Sousa (2009), that show that 
a positive shock on the side of the Government revenue have a negative impact on GDP. 
So, these results are not in line with most of the literature, although, regarding to indirect 
taxes there is some evidence (e.g. Scarlett (2011) and Ilaboya (2012)). 
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Figure 8: Cumulative response function of GDP to indirect taxes, Core countries 
 
Considering the group of the core countries, indirect taxes also have a positive 
significant effect on GDP. This is contrary to what Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagalés (2013) 
argue. They show that indirect taxes have no significant impact on growth. Also, Mountford 
and Uhlig (2009) argues that the GDP fall in response to an increase in revenue, that is, an 
anticipated increase of revenue reduces the output and consumption. Additionally, Omran 
(2017) shows that the response of the variables to a tax shock, GDP responds positively to 
a one standard deviation shock from tax revenue until the second year, however, it becomes 
constant after that. So, we can conclude that tax revenue shock has a positive but weak 
impact on output. 
But there are studies where similar conclusions to our work apply. The study done by 
Scarlett (2011) indicates that increasing the revenue from indirect taxes may conduce to 
economic growth in the long-run. Also, in this line, Ilaboya (2012) show that some indirect 
taxes have a positive impact on economic growth. And Ibadin and Oladipupo (2015) show 
that Value Added Taxes (VAT) and Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) have a positive and 
significant relationship with economic growth. 
We also could not find evidence on direct taxes and SSC to statistically affect growth. 
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Figure 9: Cumulative impulse response function of GDP to health spending, PIIGS 
 
Regarding now the expenditure side, in PIIGS, we conclude that spending on health is, 
among expenditure-side instruments, the only instrument yielding significant and positive 
effect on GDP: an increase in the spending on health will increase the GDP, contributing to 
economic growth. Kurt (2015) also found that the direct impact of government spending on 
health on economic growth is positive and significant. 
Economic growth requires public spending (namely through spending on health and 
education). So, this result is in line with expected in the literature of economic growth ( e.g. 
Sylwester (2000)). 
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Figure 10: Cumulative impulse response function of GDP to selected government 
spending side, Core countries 
 
 
In Core countries, spending on health also has a positive effect on GDP, although 
barely significant. Although, spending on social protection has a negative effect, decreasing 
the output, that is in line with Omran (2017). This proves that social protection schemes 
often involve an equity-efficiency trade-off: they may reduce inequality (cfr. Figure 6) but at 
a cost of lower efficiency. Regarding to spending on economic affairs, we can conclude that 
these have a negative impact, although barely significant, on economic growth.  
Regarding to public spending on education, our results show that these have a positive 
effect on output, that is, the increase on spending on education will generate more output in 
the core countries. According to Kabuga and Hussaini (2015), the long run coefficient of 
government spending on education are statistically significant and are positively related to 
growth. Mekdad et al. (2014) also showed that public spending on education has a strong 
positive relation with growth. But, according to Sylwester (2000), although public education 
expenditures are positively associated with future economic growth, the contemporaneous 
effect upon growth is negative, that is not in line with our results. The author shows that 
countries with a higher level of income inequality also have larger subsequent expenses for 
public education in relation to GDP. These expenses in education have a negative impact on 
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the contemporary growth, but previous expenses have a positive impact. The increase in the 
level of human capital may not have an immediate and positive impact on growth.  
Summing-up, the most relevant mechanisms are different for these groups of countries, 
For both groups of countries, there is an important contribution of health spending on GDP, 
and this has a more significant impact in PIIGS. 
Our results regarding to government revenue side show non-Keynesian effects. This 
results are not in line with most of the literature, for example, with Ramos and Roca-Sagales 
(2008), that conclude that the output effects of fiscal policy are consistent with the Keynesian 
paradigm for taxes, that is, tax cuts increase output. 
 
 4.1.3. Link between output and income inequality 
As a byproduct of our analysis, consider now the relationship between the output 
and income inequality. For this, we will analyze the accumulated impulse response functions 
of GDP to Gini, as well as the reverse, in PIIGS and in the group of the core countries.  
Figure 11: Cumulative impulse response function of Gini to GDP, PIIGS 
 
Considering the impact of GDP on income inequality, we can see from Figure 11 
that this effect is negative in the group of the PIIGS countries. That is, an increase on GDP 
will generate a decrease on the Gini coefficient. In other words, there is an inverse link 
between the growth and inequality. This is in line with Cevik and Correa-Caro (2015) that 
found the existence of an inverted relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth.  
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Figure 12: Cumulative impulse response function of Gini to GDP, Core countries 
 
Regarding core countries, we can conclude that growth does not statistically affect 
inequality, unlike the case of PIIGS. 
Figure 13: Cumulative impulse response function of GDP to Gini, PIIGS 
 
Now, considering the impact of Gini coefficient on output, in PIIGS, we conclude 
that the effect is positive, that is, an increase in Gini will increase the output. This is in line 
with Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagalés, (2013) who show that income inequality has a positive 
and significant impact on economic growth.  
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Figure 14: Cumulative impulse response function of GDP to Gini, Core countries 
 
Unlike the case of PIIGS and contrary to what Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagalés 
(2013) argues, in Core countries, income inequality has a negative effect on output, that is, 
an inverse link between these two variables arises, although barely significant. 
Also, Cingano (2014) shows that inequality has a negative impact on economic 
growth. For example, lowering inequality by 1 Gini point would translate in an increase in 
cumulative growth of 0.8 percentage points in the following 5 years (or 0.15 points per year). 
Brueckner and Lederman (2017) showed that in low income countries, the income 
inequality is positively correlated with transitional GDP per capita growth. On the other 
hand, in high income countries, there are a negative correlation between the income 
inequality and GDP. These results are in line with those we got: a positive relation between 
inequality and output in relatively lower income countries (PIIGS) while negative for 
relatively higher-income countries (core). So, we can conclude that the income inequality is 
beneficial for transitional growth in poor countries but that it is detrimental for growth in 
high-income economies.  
Summing-up, the impact of Gini to GDP is more significant and negative in the 
PIIGS. On the other hand, the Gini has a positive impact on the GDP growth in PIIGS, but 
a negative impact on growth on the Core countries. 
Moreover, we can relate these findings with those somehow referred in the former 
subsection, considering growth as the single mechanism of transmission of fiscal  policy to 
inequality: i) in PIIGS, government spending on health, indirect taxes and social security 
contributions increase output and, consequently, as output has an inverse link with Gini, 
Gini will decrease, decreasing income inequality; ii) in core countries, government spending 
on social protection decreases output and, consequently, barely decreases Gini coefficient. 
38 
 
On the other hand, government spending on education and indirect taxes will increase 
output and will, consequently increase Gini coefficient, barely increasing income inequality. 
 
4.2. Fiscal multipliers 
In the literature, fiscal multipliers tend to assess the impact of fiscal instruments on 
output. In this regard, there is no consensus on how multipliers (m) should be defined. Hjelm 
and Stockhammar (2016) present three most common options: 
 “The peak multiplier”, that compares the maximum effect of a variable (y in 
period h) of a shock to a variable (g) that takes place in period 0, that is: 
 
𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒙 =
∆𝒚𝒉
𝒎𝒂𝒙
∆𝒈𝟎
 (4.2.1) 
 “The impact multiplier” analyzes the initial effect in period 0:  
 
𝒎𝒊𝒎𝒑 =
∆𝒚𝟎
∆𝒈𝟎
 (4.2.2) 
 “The cumulative multiplier” compares the integral of the effect on two 
variables of a shock: 
 
𝒎𝒉
𝒄𝒖𝒎 =
∑𝒕=𝟎
𝒉 ∆𝒚𝒕
∑𝒕=𝟎
𝒉 ∆𝒈𝒕
 (4.2.3) 
 
The cumulative multiplier has subscript h, and is thus a vector of cumulative 
multipliers covering successively longer periods of time (Hjelm and Stockhammar, 2016).  
Although the impulse and accumulated impulse response functions are important to 
assess the impact of budgetary policies in the short, medium and long term, the impulse 
response outcomes do not correspond to the value of the multiplier. The multiplier 
calculation results from two distinct components One is the elasticity of output to the 
budgetary fiscal policy instrument, directly extracted from the outcomes of the impulse 
response functions. This component is obtained by computing, on the one hand, the impulse 
response of expenditure or revenue to a shock on itself on impact (one-shot shock) and, on 
the other hand, the cumulative responses of the output growth to a shock on public 
expenditure or public revenue over time. The multiplier is then obtained by dividing the 
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elasticity obtained by the weight of the volume of government expenditures or revenues on 
GDP in the sample considered (second component of the computation: ratio). 
In the tables presented below we can see the value of the elasticities of output to the 
budgetary fiscal policy instrument and multipliers, as well as the weight of the variable on 
GDP (ratio). We only calculate the value of the multipliers of the variables which, through 
the analysis of the impulse responses, are statistically significant. We calculate these values 
for short-run (using t=0 for government spending side variables and t=1 for government 
revenue side variables) and long-run (t=5). 
 
Table 6: Elasticities and fiscal multipliers, PIIGS 
 
PIIGS Short-run Long-run  
Elasticity Multiplier Elasticity Multiplier Ratio 
Health 0,1559 2,5288 0,7601 12,3283 6,17% 
Indirect Taxes 0,0915 0,6987 0,2048 1,5643 13,09% 
SSC 0,0883 0,7886 0,1948 1,7396 11,20% 
 
Table 7: Elasticities and fiscal multipliers, Core countries 
 
Core Short-run  Long-run (t=5)  
Elasticity Multiplier Elasticity Multiplier Ratio 
Health 0,0508 0,7217 0,1816 2,5796 7,04% 
Education 0,1003 2,0352 0,5144 10,4366 4,93% 
Social Protection -0,6724 -3,2595 -0,5719 -2,7723 20,63% 
Economic Affairs -0,0041 -0,0898 -0,0380 -0,8398 4,53% 
Indirect Taxes 0,2620 1,9124 0,5281 3,8540 13,70% 
 
The interpretation of these values is similar for all variables.  Will be presented some 
of them. 
On the spending side, starting with PIIGS, on short-run, the elasticity of output with 
respect to government spending on health is 0,1559. This implies that, a one Euro increase 
in public spending on health increases output by 2,5288€. On long-run, the elasticity of 
output with respect to government spending on health is 0,7601. So, it implies that a one 
Euro increase in public spending on health increase output in the long term by 12,328€. This 
results are in line with Gnip (2015), that showed that the multiplier associated with 
government spending is positive and above 2 in short-run and in a long-run, the effects on 
output are permanent and significant.  
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In Core countries, on short-run, the short-run elasticity of output with respect to 
government spending on social protection is -0,6724. This implies that the multiplier is about 
-3,2595, meaning that, if the government spending on social protection increase one Euro, 
the output decrease 3,2595€. The long-run multiplier is about -2,7723, meaning that, if the 
government spending on social protection increase one Euro, the output decrease 2,7723€. 
These results about government spending on social protection are in line with Afonso and 
Sousa (2008), showing that the effects on GDP are negative.  
So, the multipliers associated with government spending have a Keynesian effect, 
with an exception regarding to government spending on social protection. In this case, in 
core countries, the multiplier is negative, showing a non-Keynesian effect. So, in short-run 
our results are in line with Sen and Kaya (2015) but in long-run this is not the case. 
On the revenue side, in PIIGS, in short-run, the elasticity of output with respect to 
indirect taxes is 0,0915. This implies that a one Euro increment in indirect taxes increase 
output in short-term by 0,699€. This result are in line with Sen and Kaya (2015), that found 
that, in short run, the fiscal multiplier associated to taxes appears to be lower than 1 or 
negative. Regarding to core countries, these multiplier is bigger (1,912).  
Now, in long-term, in PIIGS, a one Euro increment in indirect taxes increase output 
in long-term by 1,564€. In turn, regarding to Core countries, the multiplier is also bigger 
(3,854), meaning that, a one Euro increment in indirect taxes increase output in long-term 
by 3,854€. Contrary, Mazar (2011) show that indirect taxes moderates GDP growth. He 
found that the multiplier associated of indirect taxes is -0.28. 
Regarding to direct taxes, the results were contrary to the expected. Only, the study 
done by Hjelm and Stockhammar (2016) also found an exception regarding to direct taxes, 
showing that shocks to direct taxes turns non-Keynesian after about one year. That is, a 
negative shock to direct taxes increase GDP in the short run, but later the multiplier turns 
non-Keynesian. 
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4.3. Fiscal “multipliers” in income inequality 
In the tables presented below we can see the value of the elasticities of income 
inequality to the fiscal policy instrument as well as the ratio between the Gini and the value 
of the fiscal policy instrument.  
We only calculate the value of the elasticities of income inequality to the budgetary 
fiscal policy instrument of the variables which, through the analysis of the impulse responses, 
are statistically significant. 
We calculate these values for short-run (using t=0 for government spending side 
variables and t=1 for government revenue side variables) and long-run (t=5). 
 
 
Table 8: Elasticities of income inequality to selected fiscal variables, PIIGS 
 
PIIGS Short-run Long-run Ratio 
Education -0,0311 -0,0611 0,0000120 
Others 0,0038 -0,1162 0,0009609 
SSC 0,0844 0,0378 0,0000048 
 
 
Table 9: Elasticities of income inequality to selected fiscal variables, Core Countries 
 
Core countries Short-run Long-run Ratio 
Education 0,4034 0,4074 0,000005 
Social Protection -0,2124 -0,4813 0,000001 
 
Regarding to Government Spending on education, in PIIGS, the elasticity on short 
run, is -0,0311. This means that, if government spending on education increases 1%, the Gini 
coefficient decrease 0,0311%. On long-run, if government spending on education increases 
1%, the Gini coefficient decrease 0,0611%. 
In Core countries, we have an opposite and bigger effect. That is, in short run, if government 
spending on education increases 1%, the Gini coefficient increase 0,4034% and in long run, 
0,4074%. 
The higher elasticity corresponds to government spending on social protection, in 
Core countries, in long-run. Its value is -0,4813, meaning that, if government spending on 
education increases 1%, the Gini coefficient decrease 0,4813%, decreasing the income 
inequality, as we had conclude before. 
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5. Conclusions 
Over recent years, income inequality has been increasing in many economies and 
fiscal policies have played a key role in trying to reduce income inequality through 
instruments as taxes and government expenditures. 
This dissertation aims at contributing to the literature on exploring and assessing the 
relation between alternative fiscal policy instruments, both from expenditure side and 
revenue side, and income distribution inequality in developed, European countries. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive review on compared mechanisms of 
different fiscal policy instruments on income inequality as we intended to do. Because there 
is still no systematic empirical overview in recent years, we propose to study such relation 
using more recent data and in developed countries. In particular, we use a panel data set 
including PIIGS countries compared with the EMU core countries. Finally, while most of 
the literature usually computes fiscal policy income multipliers, we propose to disentangle 
income and “inequality multipliers”. 
From the literature, both theoretical and empirical, regarding to revenue side, most of 
the authors conclude that direct taxes decrease the income inequality due to their usual 
progressive structure, while the indirect taxes tend to be regressive, increasing inequality. On 
the expenditure side, most of the literature conclude that public spending reduce the income 
inequality. In what regards details by functional classification, there is a consensus that 
spending on health decreases income inequality. On the other hand, results are ambiguous 
regarding spending on education and social protection. Moreover, the literature shows that 
fiscal policies have different impacts in different countries: for example, the impact of taxes 
and transfers in European developed countries are much stronger than in Latin America 
developing countries. From the literature review, we also concluded that fiscal policies have 
a stronger impact and that spending-side instruments play a much more important role in 
reducing the income inequality in developed economies. However, in developing economies, 
evidence is rather mixed, with conclusions differing across countries; however, literature 
shows that fiscal policies in these countries tend to be less redistributive.  
In order to assess the impacts of alternative instruments on income and inequality, we 
followed the methodology used by Ramos and Roca-Sagales (2008), based on a VAR model, 
covering a set of EMU countries for a time period of 20 years (1996-2015). Given our 
assumptions, the main results obtained through the VAR estimation were that: i) in PIIGS, 
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health expenditures, indirect taxes and social security contributions have a positive effect on 
output while ii) in the EMU core countries, spending on social protection has a negative 
effect on output, although education spending and indirect taxes have a positive effect; iii) 
in PIIGS, social security contributions have a positive effect on income inequality, 
aggravating it, while spending “others” has a negative effect, decreasing income inequality; 
iv) in the core countries, where spending on social protection has a negative effect on 
inequality, spending on education has a positive effect, increasing inequality; v) finally, the 
link of GDP to Gini is more significant and negative in the group of PIIGS and, on the 
reverse causality, the Gini has a positive impact on the GDP growth in PIIGS, but a negative 
impact on the growth rate of the core countries. 
When considering growth as the single mechanism of transmission of fiscal policy to 
inequality: i) in PIIGS, government spending on health, indirect taxes and social security 
contributions increase output and, consequently, as output has an inverse link with Gini, 
Gini and income inequality decrease; ii) in core countries, government spending on social 
protection decreases output and but barely decreases Gini coefficient. On the other hand, 
government spending on education and indirect taxes will increase output and will, 
consequently, barely increase income inequality. 
Moreover, we also computed fiscal multipliers for which impulse responses on 
output were statistically significant, and we concluded that the multipliers associated with 
government spending have a Keynesian effect, with the exception of government spending 
on social protection. In what regards multipliers associated with government revenue, they 
exhibit non-Keynesian effects.  On spending side, the higher fiscal multiplier is associated 
with health spending on PIIGS, and in regards to core countries, the higher fiscal multiplier 
is associated with education spending. On revenue side, the higher fiscal multiplier is 
associated with SSC on PIIGS, and in regards to core countries, the higher value is associated 
with indirect taxes. This implies that, these instruments have a stronger impact on increasing 
the output. 
We also presented the elasticities of income inequality to the fiscal policy instrument 
of the variables that are statistically significant. On core countries, these values are higher, 
meaning that, the instruments have a much stronger impact in this group of countries.  
Our results show that, as stated in the literature, there is a disparity in the effects  of 
spending on education in income inequality: it increases inequality in core countries (although 
slightly significant) and decreases in PIIGS. Additionally, in PIIGS, spending on “Others” is 
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the most effective for reducing inequality and social spending are important to reduce 
inequality but only in core countries. 
In sum, as political recommendations to reduce inequalities and promote growth, it 
will be required, for example, Governments to promote measures to encourage investment 
in education and training throughout life. In regards to taxation, in order to aggravate the 
burden of the richest and create income support of the poor, both workers and unemployed, 
governments should reconsider their programs and strengthen their design, recognizing that  
redistribution plays a very important role. 
As we can see, there is little literature assessing the links between different 
components of Government spending and income inequality, particularly with regards to 
health spending. Regarding education spending this does not happen, as there is some 
literature; however, there are mixed opinions across the authors.  
In addition, some results did not come as expected (namely the impact of direct taxes 
on output) and the statistical significance of most of the IRF was too low to provide robust 
conclusions. Considering a larger sample, including several developed countries and other, 
less developed countries, would possible provide better insights on the different impacts of 
fiscal policies on inequality across countries with substantially different structural 
characteristics. We found some differences between PIIGS and core, but, on the one hand, 
countries are rather homogeneous, and the number of observations, due to data availability 
is too short. 
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Table 2A: Descriptive statistics – Core countries 
